多伦多代写_多伦多论文essay代写范文

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关于经济的增长以及中国石油业的发展，从九十年代末开始石油化工产品行业的发展速度是令人惊叹的。因为这个行业是由国家控制的，并没有完全形成从国家机构中分离出来。这篇文章主要是研究国内三十一个企业群体（在上海和深圳的)国家石油和石化公司）周期为二零零七年至二零一一年。研究的四个领域的成果还是比较显著的：国家资产重组、国家石油业的多样化发展、企业指导以及关联产业之间的处理形式。形式的关联方法是企业融资,我们要考虑好产权对公司治理的影响。本文揭示了中国石油和石化行业特定企业发展,研究方向,是中国的大企业政策在一个不断发展的社会主义市场经济下如何推进重组状态业务接口的需要。

Tyler Rooker

Peking University Institute of Sociology and Anthropology University of Nottingham School of Contemporary Chinese Studies Publication in the CPI Working Papers series does not imply views thus expressed are endorsed or supported by the China Policy Institute or the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham.

Introduction

The growth and development of China’s oil and petrochemical industry since the late 1990s is astonishing. It is led by state-controlled business groups that only fully formed through institutional separation from the state at that time. This paper probes a group of 31 domestically-listed (in Shanghai and Shenzhen) national oil and petrochemical companies (NOPCs) in the period from 2007 to 2011. Four areas of exploration are highlighted: postrestructuring consolidation or diversification of China’s qiye jituan1 business groups;2 the nature, direction and amount of related party transactions (RPTs); forms of related party corporate finance; and the impact of property rights on corporate governance. This paper sheds light on the particular development of businesses in the oil and petrochemical industry in China and reveals directions that China’s big business policy and further restructuring of the state-business interface will take in an evolving socialist market economy. The following paper starts from the insight that virtually all oil and petrochemical big businesses circa 2007 listed in China are organized in terms of business groups. Yet the business group nature of NOPCs immediately reveals four areas of exploration. First, in the past fifteen years—since the 1997/8 restructuring and reorganization of the state industrial sector—a major reshuffling of industrial and corporate organization in the oil and petrochemical industry is apparent. Second, with this organizational form, the volume of RPTs within the business group is a proxy for the extent to which market-supporting institutions, as well as multi-divisional versus business group firms, have developed in China during this time frame. Third, related party finance—consisting of both internal reallocations of capital within the group and member firms acting on behalf of other group firms to access capital from outside the group—signals the direction of corporate finance and capital market development for national oil and petrochemical companies. Fourth, rethinking property rights, the legal/market nexus that continues to elicit debate, extends debate on the corporate governance of business groups and NOPCs in particular. While the companies reviewed in this paper are some of the most state-owned, most important and most security related companies in China, it remains unclear as to the extent to which they are following the pattern of other non-Western corporate organizational forms throughout the world, as well as those of big businesses throughout China. Research questions ‘Rationalization’ of oil and petrochemical industry The idea of China ‘transitioning’ from a planned, command or socialist economy is widespread.

Yet most scholars either omit the endpoint to which it is transitioning, orQiye jituan is the term for China’s form of business groups, and thus these two terms are used interchangeably in this paper. 2 The theory of business groups has become part of established economic theory (Granovetter 1994; Leff 1978). Its basic issues and tensions are important to facilitate the empirical discussion below. The predominance of business groups worldwide—outside the U.S. and U.K.—has been well established (La Porta et al. 1999; Khanna and Yafeh 2007). They consist of a group of legally independent companies engaged in diverse industries that are coordinated by a central authority, whether that be a family, an interlocking directorate (board of directors or presidents drawn from each of the group’s companies) or the state. Most notable are the zaibatsu of pre-WWII Japan, keiretsu of contemporary Japan, chaebol of South Korea and grupos economicos of Latin America (see Carney 2008; Colpon et al. 2010). By utilizing intergroup exchanges, financing, project execution capabilities, “big push” simultaneous development of multiple, connected industries, and risk sharing and mutual insurance, business groups facilitate economic growth and national development in the absence of market institutions that perform these functions in the West (Leff 1978; Amsden 1989; Amsden and Hikino 1994; Morck and Nakamura 2007; Khanna and Pelapu 1997).

Simply supply (Western) capitalism or a market economy. China itself claims, and has claimed for two decades, to be a socialist market economy, with ‘reform’, an endless, continuous process, occurring across multiple industries, system and policies. This paper starts from the radical restructuring of state-owned enterprises that was pushed nationally for the first time in 1997/8. Various experiments in decentralization of management (Morris et al. 2002; Cao 2000), trials of business group functions (Sutherland 2001), and closing down of industrial ministries (Garnault et al. 2005; on the oil and petrochemical industry in particular, Lin 2008) were a prelude to the radical changes pushed nationwide for the first time in 1997/8 (Naughton 2008; Oi 2011; Chiu and Lewis 2006). Oi (2011) points to the 15 th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1997 as the official start to a radical wave, while Oi and Han (2011: 22) declare the ‘late 1990s was the watershed period in China’s corporate restructuring when the nationwide pattern and speed of reform changed markedly.’ Brødsgaard (2012) explicitly names Zhu Rongji (echoing the more general work of Ji 1998, Steinfeld 1998 and Oi 2011 on restructuring of state-owned enterprises) and the 1998 administrative reform as crucial for NOPCs. Yet while the organizational form of the business group—known as the qiye jituan—emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Keister 2000; Sutherland 2001; Hahn and Lee 2006),3 post 1997/8 brought a wave of reorganization (chongzu) and restructuring (gaizhi). Whether referred to as privatization, securitization or corporatization, SOEs nationwide transformed in earnest only after 1997/8 (Morris et al. 2002; Cao 2000; Green and Liu 2005).4 Finally, it was only at this point that the main players in the oil and petrochemical industry were restructured and reorganized.5 Since that time, former SOEs have come to rule not only China but make up an increasingly significant part of the Global Fortune 500. The institutional creation of the state-owned assets and supervision commission (SASAC) for central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) in 2003, and its subsequent cascading to the provincial, municipal, prefectural, and district levels for local state-owned enterprises (LSOEs), underscored the institutional change that occurred in industrial organization and corporate form of state-owned enterprises. The consequences of institutionalizing stateownership of business assets, and their separation, reorganization and listing, has had a profound impact on the development and structure of large business groups in the past decade.6 The qiye jituan are China’s corporate form of business groups that mirrors keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in South Korea and other national business groups chronicled throughout the。

Genealogists trace the business group reform back to First Auto Works in mid-1980s (Sutherland 2001; Keister 2000; Hahn and Lee 2006). These scholars point to a group of 120 “national champions” or “trail groups” that are the basis of contemporary business groups in China, despite all three oil and petrochemical titans being left out of the trial groups. 4 Smyth (2000: 722) notes that in 1997 alone 3,000 enterprises were merged and 15.5 billion yuan in state assets was reallocated. 5 Lin (2008) argues insightfully that global economic—oil price and Asian financial—crises forced Sinopec and CNPC subsidiaries to agree to restructuring in 1997/8. But the overall restructuring across all SOEs nationwide implies a more compelling “wind” that would have forced the issue sooner or later. 6 Brødsgaard (2012), citing Lin (2003), notes that as a consequence of this overall (restructuring in oil and gas industry), local refineries and petrochemical manufacturers as well as domestic wholesalers and retailers were wiped out. Business groups consolidated power that previously had been much more regionally based. While the party’s influence was maintained through control of the appointment of CEOs and presidents of the most important companies, and the scope of business group control limited by SASAC, a fundamental reorganization of state, business and society had taken place. But this process was not a smooth exertion of central power over multiple, regional business groups with their own local powers and stakes: In one case, “it took extensive negotiations before the Shanghai city government finally agreed to the merger of the firms” (Hahn and Lee 2006: 215). This oversight of the hysteresis of development is what leads scholars such as Paik et al. (2007) to view China’s oil business groups as making decisions based on confluence of interests between government bodies top-down, erroneously giving the sense that NOPCs are not diversified beyond PetroChina, Sinopec and CNOOC.

World (Hahn and Lee 2006). The oil and petrochemical industry is also strategically protected by the Chinese government: beyond setting price regimes for oil and petrochemical products, it only has gradually liberalized tariffs on imports, only allowed imports to designated companies, prohibited free formation of joint ventures with foreign oil and petrochemical companies, and restricted availability of exploration and production licenses (Wu 2002). 7 The organizational structure of NOPCs is dominated by state-owned business group enterprises, particularly Sinopec Group, CNPC and CNOOC Group, and is identified as a pillar industry of the Chinese economy (Andrews-Speed 2004). There are various entry barriers to both foreign and domestic enterprises and prices are set by government mechanism, though some reform of price-setting began in 1998 (Zhang 2004) to make set price more accurately reflect global oil market prices. Integrating both radical restructuring and reorganization in 1997/8 with business groups as primary organizational form of business yields questions against which research data can be tested; namely, the extent to which China’s listed NOPCs have consolidated their groups into a single, multidivisional firm with majority outside ownership mirroring Western managerial capitalist forms of corporate organization (Chandler 1977, 1990). This generates a research question: what changes in industrial structure and corporate organization of NOPC business groups have occurred since the 1997/8 restructuring and reorganization? Role of RPTs in business groups ‘Related party transactions’ (guanlianfang jiaoyi; RPTs) in corporate annual reports are defined as exchanges between a group’s listed company and another company in the business group. NOPCs that engage in regular RPTs, both purchases and sales, provide a proxy for gauging either the development of market-supporting institutions (or the declining imperfection of markets) or the entrenchment of intra-group transactions despite the changing external environment in China (Carney et al. 2009). Lu et al. (2004) study RPTs, distinguishing between related party purchases and related party sales, of China listed firms in 2001 and find that related party sales are more important to control product distribution. Yeh et al. (2009) and Berkman et al. (2010) use RPTs as a direct proxy for corporate governance (or lack thereof). As Cheung et al. (2009) also show, analyzing RPTs in China’s business groups allows understanding of the degree to which listed companies are supported by these transactions, i.e. that transactions are valued above or below external rates, and thus represent either a premium paid by listed company or a discount enjoyed by it. Jian and Wong (2004) find that RPTs minimize transaction costs and help manage earnings between different group firms. RPTs allow the diversion of corporate wealth into other uses by the business group (Jian and Xu 2012). Despite their importance to NOPC corporate organization and operation, related party transaction are often only viewed as either propping up or tunnelling away the listed firm’s assets and profits (Jian and Wong 2010; Williams and Taylor 2013). In this paper, NOPC groups’ internal or RPTs measure the extent of market institution internalization. Over time, increasing volume and ratio of RPTs indicates worsening market institutional environment, while decreasing volume and ratio indicates improving market。