英格兰MBA Essay_英国商科Essay代写

发布时间：2021-07-20 热度：

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在英国留学的同学们选择商科的非常多，而想要写好一篇商科Essay并不简单，需要做好很多工作。英国环球论文小编整理了一些你需要做的工作以及注意事项希望可以帮助到大家。

审题
即便你文笔不好，只要不离题，至少不会挂科，但是一旦你离题了，那么挂科就向你招手了。对于常去上课的学生而言，审题基本不会出现大的问题，只要按课程的内容方向写就可以了。

构思
大部分同学没有列提纲的习惯，写到哪算哪，经常不知道自己该继续写什么，自然就导致逻辑比较混乱，给评分老师一个很差的印象，分数就很难提高。构思和列提纲的目的在于让你对整篇文章将要写的内容了然于胸，一气呵成。
立意定题
通过立意来定题并非一个容易的事情，定一个好的题目是很难的。这里要注意的是，老师给的题目通常不能直接作为你文章的题目，它只是一个主题。在确定题目的时候，要紧跟审题和构思这两步，在构思的基础上进行简化或者细化。简化说的是将题目的长度和内容进行缩减，精简概括。

如何高效地收集有效的资料
资料的收集，要采用内外结合的方式。内部方面，指的是老师提供的lecture notes，课本等材料，这些材料比较基础，能保证写出来的东西基本不离题，但是很难出彩。因此，这就需要我们寻找外部资料的支持。

英格兰MBA Essay案列选段：

China Southern Airlines was headquartered in Guangzhou and established on March 25, 1995 (China Southern, 2018). It is the airline with the largest number of transport aircraft, the most developed route network and the largest passenger traffic in China. The data shows that the price of air tickets of China Southern Airlines has risen by less than 1% in the past 10 years (China Southern, 2018). In the context of China's annual average inflation rate of more than 8%, it shows that China Southern Airlines always uses low-cost competition to participate in market competition. One of the main reasons for that is the rise of China's high-speed rail. On the one hand, high-speed rail continues to use low-cost methods to seize the market share of China Southern Airlines, and Southern Airlines has to make frequent discounts. With the continuous improvement of manpower and operating costs, the profit margin of China Southern Airlines is getting smaller and smaller. For China Southern Airlines, understanding the essential reasons for price wars, determining a properly price, and getting rid of vicious price competitions are of great significance to the healthy development of China Southern Airlines.

2.2 Game theory

In a game, based on whether the participants can negotiate freely before taking any action, and whether the mutually beneficial action plan or strategy can reach a binding agreement, a game can be divided into cooperative game and non-cooperative game (Nash, 1951). A reasonable and predictable feature of a cooperative game is that it is Pareto optimal: if a different strategy can be used to simultaneously improve the situation of two participants, they will definitely agree to do that (Sehipper,  Nijkamp and Rietveld, 2007). However, in reality, competitors in many cases find it difficult to reach a binding agreement, so the solution in the competition in this case cannot reach the Pareto optimality, but only the Pareto suboptimal (Hsu, Lee and Liao, 2001). One of the most typical examples is the prisoner's dilemma often studied. A study of the prisoner's dilemma found that oligopolists often struggled with a prisoner's dilemma when deciding their pricing strategy (Netessine and Shumsky, 2005). They must decide whether to take aggressive pricing to gain a larger market share at the expense of competitors' losses, or to adopt a more moderate pricing strategy to coexist with competitors in the current state of their respective market share and obtain higher profits than when competition is fierce (Anjos, Cheng and Currie, 2004). This is the inevitable result of a non-cooperative game. In a non-cooperative game, to accurately predict the behavior of rational participants in a game, it needs to introduce a concept of “Nash Equilibrium”, which refers to that in non-cooperative game strategies, in the case where other people do not change their strategies, the strategy of all players is the best for themselves. At the Nash (1951) equilibrium point, every player in the game has no motivation to change their strategy alone. Cooperative game refers to a binding agreement between players, such as price alliances between oligopolistic companies, etc. (Nash, 1951).

2.3 The price game between high-speed rail and aviation industry in China

Aviation industry

Unchanged fare fare reduction

High-speed rail Unchanged price 5 10 -10 15

Price reduction 15 -5 -5 -5

Table 1 Simulation of price game of China Southern Airlines with China's high-speed rail Shao (2015)

The following is a game that simulates the price strategy of aviation and high-speed rail according to game theory.

If high-speed rail reduces price and aviation industry keeps the price unchanged, then high-speed rail will profit 15, aviation industry will lose 5, the overall profit will be 10; if both high-speed rail and aviation industry keep the price unchanged, then high-speed rail will profit 5 and aviation industry will profit 10, the overall profit will be 15; if high-speed rail keeps the price unchanged, and aviation industry reduces price, then high-speed rail will lose 10 and aviation industry will profit 15, the overall profit will be 5; if both high-speed rail and aviation industry reduce price, then high-speed rail will lose 5 and aviation industry will lose 5 neither, the overall loss will be 10.
 

For the high-speed rail, the price cut is obviously better than the maintenance. The expected return of the high-speed rail price reduction is 10 (15-5), and the retained income is -5 (5-10). The high-speed rail is for its own maximizing returns will inevitably reduce prices. From the perspective of China Southern Airlines, price cut is also better than maintenance, because the profit of its price cuts are 10 (15-5), the maintenance income is 5 (10-5), and it will most probably choose to cut prices. Or it can be said that this price war will definitely be provoked by high-speed rail, because the price cut will definitely bring higher profits and encroach on the aviation market share, and aviation has to choose to cut prices in order to meet the challenges of high-speed rail. Therefore, both the high-speed rail and the aviation industry have chosen to reduce prices as a strategy. From the perspective of revenue, they lose 5 and the overall loss is 10. The overall benefit at this time is the worst. This is the Nash equilibrium situation pointed out above. When each individual seeks to maximize the benefits, the overall interests are not optimal or even the worst, that is, the non-cooperative game can only reach the Pareto suboptimal.