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提供美国留学生经济学作业。Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization
Armen A. Alchian; Harold Demsetz
The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec., 1972), pp. 777-795.
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Production, Information Costs, andEconomic Organization
The mark of a capitalistic society is thatresources are owned and allocated by suchnongovernmental organizations as firms,households, and markets. Resource ownersincrease productivity through cooperativespecialization and this leads to the demandfor economic organizations which facilitatecooperation. \$'hen a lumber millemploys a cabinetmaker, cooperation betweenspecialists is achieved within a firm,
and when a cabinetmaker purchases woodfrom a lumberman, the cooperation takesplace across markets (or between firms).
Two important problems face a theory oeconomic organization-to explain theconditions that determine whether thegains from spkcialization and cooperativeproduction can better be obtained withinan organization like the firm, or acrossmarkets, and to explain the structure ofthe organization.
I t is common to see the firm characterizedby the power to settle issues byfiat, by authority, or by disciplinary actionsuperior to that available in the conventionalmarket. This is delusion. The firmdoes not own all its inputs. I t has nopower of fiat, no authority, no disciplinaryaction any different in the slightest degreefrom ordinary market contracting betweenany two people. I can "punish" youonly by withholding future business or byseeking redress in the courts for any failureto honor our exchange agreement. That isexactly all that any employer can do. He* Professors of economics at the Fniversit~ of California,
1.0s Xngeles .\ckno~\ledgment is made for financia1aid from the F. I,ill> Endowment, Inc, grant tocCL.4 for research in the behavioral effects of propertyrightscan fire or sue, just as I can fire my grocerby stopping purchases from him or suehim for delivering faulty products. What
then is the content of the presumed powerto manage and assign workers to varioustasks? Exactly the same as one little consumer'spower to manage and assign hisgrocer to various tasks. The single consumercan assign his grocer to the task ofobtaining whatever the customer can inducethe grocer to provide at a price acceptableto both parties. That is preciselyall that an employer can do to an employee.
To speak of managing, directing,or assigning workers to various tasks is adeceptive way of noting that the employercontinually is involved in renegotiation ofcontracts on terms that must be acceptableto both parties. Telling an employee totype this letter rather than to file thatdocument is like my telling a grocer tosell me this brand of tuna rather than thatbrand of bread. I have no contract to continueto purchase from the grocer andneither the employer nor the employee isbound by any contractual obligations tocontinue their relationship. Long-termcontracts between employer and employeeare not the essence of the organizationwe call a firm. My grocer can counton my returning day after day and purchasinghis services and goods even withthe prices not always marked on the goods-because I know what they are-and headapts his activity to conform to mydirections to him as to what I want eachday . . . he is not my employee.iyherein then is the relationship betweena grocer and his differentfrom that between a grocer and his cus-
777
778 THE AMERICAX ECONOMIC REL'IE\ITtomers? It is in a team use of inputs and acentralized position of some party in thecontractual arrangements of all other inputs.It is the centralized contractz~al agentin a team ProductiCLle process-not somesuperior authoritarian directive or disciplinarypower. Exactly what is a teamprocess and why does it induce the contractualform, called the firm? These problemsmotivate the inquiry of this paper.
I. The Metering Problem
'The economic organization throughwhich input owners cooperate will makebetter use of their comparative advantagesto the extent that it facilitates the paymentof rewards in accord with productivity.If rewards were random, and withoutregard to productive effort, no incentiveto productive effort would be providedby the organization; and if rewardswere negatively correlated with productivitythe organization would be subjectto sabotage. Two key demands are placedon an economic organization-meteringinput productivity and metering rewards.'Metering problems sometimes can beresolved well through the exchange ofproducts across competitive markets, becausein many situations markets yield ahigh correlation between rewards andproductivity. If a farmer increases his outputof wheat by 10 percent at the prevailingmarket price, his receipts also increaseby 10 percent. This method of organizingeconomic activity meters theoutput directly, reveals the marginal productand apportions the rewards to resourceowners in accord with that directmeasurement of their outputs. The successof this decentralized, market exchange inpromoting productive specialization requiresthat changes in market rewards fallMeter means to measure and also to apportion. Onecan meter (measure) output and one can also meter(control) the output. LVe use the word to denote both;the context should indicate which.
